

Message Text

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10

ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ADP-00 SY-07 USIA-12 AID-20 PER-05 M-03

A-01 OC-06 CCO-00 CIAE-00 INR-09 NSAE-00 RSC-01 RSR-01

OS-03 INRE-00 /097 W

----- 089156

P R 161455 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2166

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

C O N F I D E N T I A L KAMPALA 999

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ASEC PFOR PINS US UG

BEIRUT FOR RSS

NAIROBI FOR RSO

SUBJECT: POST SECURITY

REF: A) STATE 47003 B) USIA 4842 C) KAMPALA 900 D) KAMPALA 955

SUMMARY: POST SECURITY WATCH COMMITTEE/ COUNTRY TEAM MET MARCH 16 AND APPROVED THIS CABLE. IT GIVES OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF OUR SECURITY SITUATION AND MAKES CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THIS MISSION. END SUMMARY

1. OUR SECURITY DANGERS CAN BE ANALYZED UNDER FOLLOWING FOUR CATAGORIES:

A) KONODOISM, MAINLY ARMED ROBBERIES OF CARS AND BURGLARIES OF HOMES BY ARMED GANGS. THESE CRIMES ARE APPARENTLY USUALLY CARRIED OUT BY ELEMENTS OF SECURITY FORCES OR WITH THEIR COLLUSION/ COOPERATION, WHICH IS WHY THEY ARE SO DIFFICULT TO COMBAT AND PRACTICALLY ALWAYS TO UNPUNISHED. THIS IS A CONTINUING AND LONG- TERM PROBLEM WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN LIVING FOR SOME TIME. IT IS A CYCLICAL PHENOMEN WHICH COMES AND
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GOES IN WAVES. ALL RESIDENT AMERICANS, OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE, ARE POTENTIAL TARGETS OF THIS SORT OF ACTIVITY, BECASUE WE ARE

AN AFFLUANT ELEMENT OF THE POPULACE WHO OWN THINGS WORTH STEALING. NUMBER OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THIS THREAT ARE POSSIBLE, AND WE ARE TAKING THEM, INCLUDING MORE GUARDS ON HOUSES, LOCKS AND GRILLS, SILENT ALARMS TO SECURITY, DOGS, SIRENS ON HOMES, INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL ON PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES, EXTENSIVE HOME RADIONET.

B) OFFICIALLY- SATIONED OR CONDONED REPRESSIVE MEASURES BY UGANDAN SECURITY FORCES, INCLUDING ABDUCTIONS, ARBITRARY ARRESTS, MURDERS AND ASSASSINATIONS OF PROMINENT PERSONS AND THE NOT- SO- PROMINENT. THIS ASPECT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HAS NOT TO DATE BEEN A PROBLEM FOR US BECASUE IT HAS BEEN SELECTIVELY TARGETTED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST AFRICANS, PLUS A FEW ASIANS LAST FALL. IF THIS ACTIVITY WERE EVER TO BE EXTENDED AGAINST FOREIGNERS AS WELL, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE A VERY MAJOR THREAT, BUT IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THIS HAPPENING.

C) EVER- PRESENT POSSIBILITY THAT THERE WILL BE A GENERAL BREAK- DOWN OF LAW AND ORDER, MOST PROBABLY AFTER A SUCCESSFUL OR UN- SUCCESSFUL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST GENERAL AMIN OR A SUCCESSFUL OR UNSUCCESSFUL COUP D' ETAT. THE PROBABLE RESULT WOULD BE A MAJOR INSTANCE OF INTERNAL WARFARE WITHIN THE FACTION- RIDDEN ARMY WHICH COULD LAST FOR SOME TIME, SINCE NO FACTION SEEMS STRONG ENOUGH TO DOMINATE IN QUICK ORDER, AND THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL WAR ENDURING FOR A PROTRATED PERIOD. WE BELIEVE THAT IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, WHICH IS UN- PREDICTABLE (IN SENSE IT COULD HAPPEN TOMORROW, NEXT MONTH OR NEXT YEAR, OR NEVER,) OUR BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO LIE LOW, STAY AT HOME, KEEP OUT OF SIGHT, BUT NOT TO EVACUATE, FOR TO DO SO WOULD FORCE US TO MOVE INTO OR THROUGH AREAS OF GREAT DANGER WHERE MILITARY CLASHES WERE TAKING PLACE. THIS SECURITY THREAT MIGHT BE A STRICTLY UGANDAN AFFAIR, IN WHICH WE COULD AVOID ANY INVOLVEMENT IF WE KEPT OUT OF SIGHT. THERE IS SOME CHANCE, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGNERS WOULD BE TARGETTED IF THE WORD WAS SPREAD THROUGH THE MILITARY THAT FOREIGNERS WERE BEHIND COUP OR ASSASSINATION.

D) A TERRORIST ATTACK, MOST PROBABLY PALESTINIAN, WITH ONE OR MORE OF SEVERAL POSSIBLE AIMS: ASSASSINATION, ABDUCTION FOR PURPOSE EXTORTION, INVASION OF CHANCERY TO TAKE POSSESSION OF IT, OR OTHER. TARGETS IN THIS INSTANCE LIKELY BE LIMITED TO
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OUR OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS (MAINLY CHANCERY) AND SENIOR OFFICER OR PERSONNEL (AMBASSADOR, CHARGE, PERHAPS OTHER SENIOR OFFICER OR OFFICERS). THERE EXIST TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT AS TO THE VULNER- ABILITY OF KAMPALA TO SUCH AN INCIDENT. ONE THEORY IS THAT BECAUSE OF AMIN' S TOTAL SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE THE BSO MIGHT CHOOSE THIS AS A LOCALE WITH A FRIENDLY CLIMATE WHERE THEY WOULD OPERATE WITH RELATIVE IMPUNITY. AN OPPOSING THEORY IS THAT THE BSO WOULD NOT WANT TO RISK LOSING UGANDA AS A

FOOTHOLD, SINCE THEY HAVE BENEFITTED BY THE EXPULSION OF THE ISRAELIS AND THE OPENING OF A PLO OFFICE, BENEFITS WHICH THEY WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO EXTEND TO AS MUCH OF THE REST OF BLACK AFRICA AS POSSIBLE. WE HAVE LIMITED DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST THIS SORT OF THREAT, BUT HAVE BEEN AND ARE TAKING MEASURES DISCUSSED IN NUMBER OF OTHER MESSAGES THIS PAST WEEK.

2. COUNTRY TEAM MAKES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE SEVERAL ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION:

A) USAID: SCHEDULED ETSS ARE UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW WITH OBJECTIVE OF EARLIEST POSSIBLE PHASE- OUT WITHOUT CAUSING UNDUE ALARM, TO BE ACHIEVED AT VERY LATEST BY JUNE 30, 1973. AS INDICATED KAMAPALA 972, WE HAVE PROPOSED CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR EARLIER- THAN- SCHEDULED DEPARTURE OF SOME ACIDI PERSONNEL. COUNTRY TEAM BELIEVES OUR BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO PROCEED WITH REASONABLY GRADUAL PHASE- OUT OF USAID IN ORDER NOT TO SEND OUT SIGNALS OF PANIC AND OVER- HASTY DEPARTURE LOCALLY WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE AN ADVERSE REACTION BY GOU. IF WE CARRY OUT AGREED OBJECTIVE REASONABLY GRADUALLY WE BELIEVE WE CAN LIVE WITH WHATEVER UNPLEASANTNESSESS MAY EMANATE FROM GENERAL AMIN AND HIS COHORTS.

B) USIS: WE CONCUR WITH REFTEL B THAT USIS SHOULD REDUCE TO ONE OFFICER. WE CONCUR FURTHER THAT OFFICER WHO SHOULD DEPART IS PAO MATEER IN VIEW ANTICIPATED SCHOOL PROBLEM. RATHER THAN LEAVE IMMEDIATELY, HOWEVER, WE RECOMMEND ETD OF APPROXIMATELY MAY 15. CANNING WOULD CARRY ON AS ACTING PAO. OPERATION IS ALREADY LOW- KEY AND WOULD CONTINUE SO. COUNTRY TEAM ADDITIONALLY BELIEVES USIA SHOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY CLOSING OUT OPERATIONS HERE COMPLETELY IN VIEW SEVERLY REDUCED PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES AND SECURITY DANGERS FOR PERSONNEL. WE RECOMMEND A CONSTANT REVIEW OF SITUATION HERE WITH AN EYE TO POSSIBLE CLOSE- DOWN BY JUN 30, 1973, WHICH WOULD ALSO BE CANNING' S ETD. (PAO IS CONFIDENTIAL

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REPLYING MORE FULLY TO REFTEL B BY SEPTTEL).

C) EMBASSY: MCDONALD HAS ADVANCED HIS ETD TO APRIL 2. WITH HIS DEPARTURE WE WILL BE DOWN TO FIVE OFFICERS (KEELEY, BURROWS, HASSE, BARCAS, RINGDAHL) PLUS SIX COMMUNICATIONS/ SECRETARIAL PERSONNEL (NOSKO DEL PRINCIPE DENNIS WICKE SHUMAN CHRISTENSEN) AND MSG OF SIX MEN. IN OUR OPINION THIS IS MINIMUM STAFFING WE NEED TO CARRY OUT OUR ASSIGNED TASKS BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE 30, 1973. FOLLOWING THAT DATE BELIEVE WE COULD REDUCE BY ONE COMMUNICATOR AND ONE SECRETARY PROVIDING REMAINING SECRETARY HAD COOMO TRAINING TO SERVE AS BACK- UP. WE ALSO COULD USE EFFECTIVELY ONE ADDITIONAL PERSON, AN EXPERIENCED GSO ON TDY BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE 30. FURTHERMORE, BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE COMING SUMMER DEPT SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO REPLACING ON- BOARD PERSONNEL HAVING SCHOOL- AGE CHILDREN WITH OTHERS NOT SO ENDOWED, BECAUSE OF SCHOOL/

SECURITY PROBLEMS. FOR ALL THOSE REMAINING AFTER JUNE 30 WE EFFECTED REGROUPMENT OR RESIDENCES IN SINGLE AREA, WITH PERHAPS ONE OR TWO EXCEPTIONS.

3. COUNTRY TEAM CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS IS STILL NOT CALLED FOR. SECURITY DANGERS DISCUSSED UNDER PARA 1 A, B, AND C ABOVE HAVE NOT CHANGED MATERIALLY IN RECENT WEEKS, THOUGH WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY OVER-ALL IMPROVEMENT IN COMING MONTHS. MAJOR NEW THREAT MISSION FACES IS THAT COVERED PARA 1 D ABOVE, AND EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE NO LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP TO THAT THREAT OR MEASURES TAKEN TO COMBAT IT.

4. HOWEVER, IN INTEREST OF REDUCING OVERALL OFFICIAL USG PRESENCE IN UGANDA, COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDS THAT DEPARTMENT RESPOND FAVORABLE TO PROPOSAL SET FORTH IN KAMPALA 955, AND GIVE STATE/ USIA DEPENDENTS OPTION (WHICH AID PERSONNEL HAVE ALREADY) OF LEAVING UGANDA AND RE- ESTABLISHING SELVES IN KENYA OR IN US. PROVISION OF SMA FOR DEPENDENTS WHO DEPART WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE SUCH DEPARTURES.
KEELEY

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